What is an epidemic? Currents in contemporary bioethics. by Anomaly, J
2	 journal	of	law,	medicine	&	ethics
Jonny Anomaly, Ph.D., is affiliated with the Duke/UNC program in philosophy, 
politics & economics.  
Currents in Contemporary 
Bioethics
Jonny Anomaly
Misuse of the word “epidemic” has 
become an epidemic. In this note I 
examine several accounts of what 
it means to be an epidemic, explore 
what I take to be the motivation for 
over-extending the term, and explain 
why I think we should use it in a more 
careful way. 
Epidemics, Old and New
The term “epidemic” can be traced 
back to Hippocrates, and it appears at 
least three times in his brief book, Of 
the Epidemics, which is mainly a col-
lection of medical case descriptions.1 
In each instance, Hippocrates uses 
the term to describe seasonal out-
breaks of infectious diseases, though 
he knew little about the etiology of 
infection.2 For more than two mil-
lennia, the term continued to be used 
to indicate a sudden surge in disease, 
or symptoms of disease, in a popula-
tion. Over time, it evolved to refer to 
single diseases rather than clusters of 
diseases or symptoms, but the essen-
tial meaning remained remarkably 
constant for over two thousand years. 
According to the Oxford English dic-
tionary, the primary definition of epi-
demic continues to be “a widespread 
occurrence of an infectious disease in 
a community at a particular time.”3 
Although vague, this account nicely 
captures the common thought that 
epidemics have something to do with 
a spike in infectious disease in a par-
ticular population.
An even more precise account is 
found in the first edition of the Oxford 
Companion to Medicine, which 
defines epidemic as “an outbreak of 
disease such that for a limited period 
of time a significantly greater number 
of persons in a community or region 
are suffering from it than is normally 
the case…The extent and duration of 
an epidemic are determined by the 
interaction of such variables as the 
nature and infectivity of the causal 
agent, its mode of transmission, 
the degree of preexisting and newly 
acquired immunity, etc.”4 This defini-
tion is clear and concise, and it hints 
at why epidemics occur and how they 
evolve. However, just 15 years later, 
the 3rd edition of the Oxford Com-
panion to Medicine reflects a newer 
and less helpful use of the term: “An 
epidemic is the occurrence of num-
bers of cases of a disease clearly above 
normal expectations.”5 References to 
infection and duration are dropped, 
though an above normal rate of dis-
ease remains as a criterion. 
Other dictionaries and textbooks 
have made further changes, includ-
ing dropping disease as a necessary 
condition, so that many now consider 
an epidemic anything that negatively 
impacts the health or welfare of a 
large number of people in a popu-
lation.6 In some cases, the primary 
definition is confined to infectious 
disease, but the secondary one covers 
all unexpected adverse events that 
affect a population. For example, the 
Oxford Dictionary Online includes 
as a secondary definition: “a sudden, 
widespread occurrence of a particu-
lar undesirable phenomenon” and 
lists “an epidemic of violence” as an 
example of this sense of the term.7
I will argue that the newer mean-
ing of “epidemic” suffers from three 
main problems: it lacks precision 
and explanatory power, it is politi-
cally controversial, and it contributes 
to the increasingly common percep-
tion of epidemiology (which began 
as the study of epidemics) and public 
health (which began as the branch of 
medicine charged with treating and 
preventing epidemics) as fields of 
study with no clear mission or unique 
domain. 
The first problem with the second-
ary sense of epidemic is that it is too 
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inclusive to pick out a clear set of 
issues. For example, if an epidemic 
occurs whenever an unusually large 
number of people in a population 
are adversely affected by an event, 
we would have to include as epidem-
ics the increase in amputees during 
World War II, the uptick in children 
who drown in rivers after Indian 
monsoons, and deaths and injuries 
in Indonesia that occurred after the 
massive 2004 tsunami. These are 
medically important events, and in 
some ways the resulting injuries were 
unexpected, but few would consider 
them epidemics. The main reason 
seems to be that they are not caused 
by infectious agents. In all three cases 
there is a clear and common cause of 
injury, but there is no vector or vehi-
cle that transmits the medical event 
from one person to another. 
The second problem with the 
expansive account of epidemic is that 
it tends to license a certain amount of 
political manipulation.8 It is increas-
ingly common for well-meaning 
journalists, politicians and scientists 
to label global problems as “pandem-
ics” (epidemics that cross borders) 
or “public health crises” in order to 
draw attention to them. Even for 
infectious disease, controversies 
have raged over whether to label 
recent outbreaks of Avian and Swine 
flu as “pandemics.” Some suspect 
that the main motivation for label-
ing them pandemics is to raise public 
awareness and government funding 
for vaccination rather than to accu-
rately depict the (likely) trajectory 
of infection.9 Because epidemics and 
pandemics caused by infectious dis-
ease can be scary events that inflict 
large losses, most people are will-
ing to make significant sacrifices to 
address them. The relevant sacrifices 
include foregoing freedom to travel 
to certain regions, and paying higher 
taxes to finance vaccination provi-
sion and disease surveillance pro-
grams. If people are willing to make 
these sacrifices in order to diminish 
the threat of traditional epidemics, 
perhaps activists think they will be 
more willing to endorse restrictive 
laws or higher taxes to address obe-
sity, autism, and income inequality, 
among other issues.
As public health professors Eileen 
O’Neil and Elena Naumova have 
argued, when “outbreak” and “epi-
demic” are used to describe problems 
like obesity and autism, the motiva-
tion may be to manipulate public 
opinion in order to justify precon-
ceived policies.10 This is a dangerous 
trend, and one that should be avoided 
by scientists, and by scientific nomen-
clature. When physicians, scientists 
and public health activists claim that 
“X is an epidemic,” the words con-
jure images of a rapidly spreading 
infectious disease that claims victims 
indiscriminately, not a steady uptick 
in the diagnosis of developmental 
disabilities or an increased consump-
tion of carbohydrates. 
A third problem for the more 
expansive account of epidemic is 
that epidemiologists – whose main 
job is to discover, describe and 
address epidemics – are not neces-
sarily well-placed to solve the many 
problems that fall within its scope, 
such as poverty, rape, and unem-
ployment. Epidemiologists have no 
special expertise about what causes 
these conditions, or how best to 
treat them. Instead, political scien-
tists, economists, and psychologists 
are often better equipped to tell us 
how to improve employment pros-
pects, to create institutions that 
minimize violence, and so on. Of 
course, epidemiologists should seek 
out and synthesize knowledge from 
different fields. But there are good 
reasons to be skeptical when we 
are told that since violent crime is 
an epidemic, we should pay special 
attention to what epidemiologists 
say about its causes and solutions. 
There are perfectly good reasons, 
though, to listen to what traditional 
epidemiologists say about how to 
control the spread of infectious 
disease. 
Communicating Risk
One of the main causes for concern 
with an over-extended definition 
of “epidemic” is that it may become 
more difficult for physicians and 
public health practitioners to explain 
the relevant risks to non-specialists. 
Arguably the best way of communi-
cating the risks associated with an 
epidemic is to explicitly describe its 
characteristics, such as the speed of 
transmission, the number of new 
cases, and the nature and severity of 
symptoms.11 It is also important to 
classify a population-wide event as 
either contagious or non-contagious. 
If the newer and broader definition 
of epidemic sticks, we should at least 
be honest about whether the condi-
tion is truly contagious, or whether 
it just happens to negatively affect a 
large number of people. We might be 
tempted to say some conditions that 
influence population health are “cul-
turally contagious,” rather than bio-
logically contagious, but it is worth 
remembering that even powerful 
trends that use culture as a vector 
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are not literally contagious since peer 
pressure can be resisted. 
Consider adult obesity as a case 
in point. Obesity has been labeled 
an “outbreak” and an “epidemic,” 
and it is increasingly called a “pan-
demic” and a “public health crisis.” 
While each of these descriptions has 
different connotations, all of them 
have powerful emotional resonance 
for those familiar with the history 
of infectious disease. They suggest 
that people who are significantly 
overweight are in a position similar 
to victims of anthrax or the Spanish 
flu. Yet the differences are enormous. 
For one thing, voluntary choice typi-
cally plays a bigger role in explaining 
behavior that leads to obesity than it 
does in explaining the contraction of 
anthrax.12 More importantly, adults 
are not infected with obesity in the 
way we are infected with influenza 
and other contagious diseases, and 
there is no single causal agent that 
leads to changes in obesity rates 
within a population.
If the definitions of “epidemic” and 
related terms (like “outbreak” and 
“pandemic”) continue to evolve in the 
current direction, it is likely that citi-
zens and policymakers will respond 
by greeting new public health warn-
ings with indifference, and poten-
tially hostility. Just as many of us roll 
our eyes when politicians declare yet 
another war on something they disap-
prove of (drugs, abortion, poverty),13 
many people are likely to ignore 
warnings of impending epidemics as 
the term becomes increasingly amor-
phous. The authors of a recent article 
on epidemics worry that public trust 
may be at stake:
Lack of precision is an unsure 
foundation for disease surveillance, 
causing a gradual but real erosion 
of trust of public health profes-
sionals for failure to develop sound 
policy in an appropriate manner… 
The danger, of course, is that when 
a real event occurs, the force of the 
word [“epidemic” or “outbreak”] has 
been exhausted and communication 
about a catastrophic event may be 
hampered, both among public health 
professionals and to the public. With 
overuse and imprecision, policy rec-
ommendations that rely upon public 
behavior change may be taken less 
seriously.14 
We can use words and deploy con-
cepts however we like, but we should 
resist the temptation to describe 
medical conditions in ways that are 
intended to increase fear rather than 
accurately portray a problem. Pub-
lic health practitioners and journal-
ists would be wise to heed George 
Orwell’s injunction in “Politics and 
the English Language” to choose our 
words carefully: “man may take to 
drink because he feels himself to be 
a failure, and then fail all the more 
completely because he drinks. It is 
rather the same thing that is hap-
pening to the English language. It 
becomes ugly and inaccurate because 
our thoughts are foolish, but the slov-
enliness of our language makes it eas-
ier for us to have foolish thoughts.”15 
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